LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

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REGULATING REGULATION:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
AND
REGULATORY INSTRUMENTS

James T. Hamilton

Special Editor

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